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Abstract
In response to population aging, pay-as-you-go pensions are being reduced in almost all de-
veloped countries. In many countries, governments aim to ﬁll the resulting gap with subsidized
private pensions. This paper exploits the recent German pension reform to shed new light on the
uptake of voluntary, but heavily subsidized private pension schemes. Speciﬁcally, we investi-
gate how the uptake of the recently introduced ‘Riester pensions’ depends on state-provided
saving incentives, and how well the targeting at families and low-income households works in
practice.
We show that, after a slow start, private pension plans took oﬀ very quickly. While saving
incentives were eﬀective in reaching parents, they were less successful in attracting low-income
earners, although Riester pensions exhibit a more equal pattern by income than occupational
pensions and unsubsidized private pension plans.
We also provide circumstantial evidence on displacement eﬀects between saving for old-age
provision and other purposes. Households who plan to purchase housing are less likely to have
a Riester pension. The same holds for households who attach high importance to a bequest
motive. Occupational pensions and other forms of private pensions, however, act as comp-
lements rather than as substitutes.
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1 Introduction
Demographic change poses major problems for public pay-as-you-go pension
schemes around the world. Many countries have therefore introduced pension re-
forms that reduce the level of pay-as-you-go-ﬁnanced public pensions. Since this will
create a gap in old-age income relative to the current beneﬁt level, many governments
have accompanied public pension reform with a strengthening of funded second- and
third-pillar pensions. In order to accelerate the uptake of such pensions, savings are
often heavily subsidized, usually in the form of ﬂat-rate beneﬁts, tax credits, and/or
tax deductions. Sometimes, these subsidies are targeted, e.g. for low-income in-
dividuals or families with children.
Do these subsidies work? This is the key question addressed by this paper. We
exploit the recent German pension reform in order to shed new light on this question.
Speciﬁcally, we are interested in public acceptance of the new pension plans and
its dynamics over time. Moreover, we want to better understand the distributional
aspects : for whom the saving incentives work, i.e. who has joined the new subsidized
pension scheme, and who is likely to be left with a pension gap. Finally, we investigate
whether the new private pension plans displace saving for other purposes.
Voluntary, but highly subsidized supplemental private pensions, so-called ‘Riester
pensions, ’ were introduced in 2001 as part of a general overhaul of the German
pension system.1 Subsidies increased in a step-wise fashion from 2002 until 2008,
allowing us to identify the eﬀects of subsidies on uptake rates. We use the German
SAVE data, a new panel data set on households’ saving and asset choices, socio-
demographic characteristics, and psychological determinants of saving and old-age
provision behavior. Currently, the SAVE data capture the time period between 2001
and 2006 and oﬀer a unique opportunity to investigate old-age provision based on
very recent data with a broad set of explanatory variables.
The issues investigated in our paper contribute to the discussion about the impact
of retirement saving incentives in various countries. In the US, Venti and Wise (1990)
on the one side and Gale and Scholz (1994) on the other side have sparked a very
controversial discussion about the eﬃcacy of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
as saving devices ; see Skinner and Hubbard (1996) for an early review. Disney et al.
(2001) have provided a helpful review tailored to the UK situation. These con-
troversies have accompanied pension reform in almost all developed countries,
generating an interest in cross-national analyses of retirement saving behavior under
diﬀerent tax and subsidy regimes, see Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003, 2004). This paper adds the
recent German experience to this discussion.
The paper is also linked to recent research in behavioral economics and comp-
lements the laboratory evidence on behavior in complex dynamic decision situations
(e.g., Schunk and Winter, 2007) with experiences from real-life decision situations,
speciﬁcally decisions about old-age provision. Our paper provides striking evi-
dence that the uptake of Riester pension plans occurred only after substantial
1 In essence, the formerly monolithic German pay-as-you-go system is transiting to a multi-pillar system
with public, occupational and private pensions. For a detailed description of the pension reform process
in Germany see Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke (2004). The ‘Riester pensions’ are named after Walter Riester,
former German Secretary of Labor and Social Security, who introduced the 2001 pension reform.
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simpliﬁcations had been made. This provides evidence that customers are deterred by
overly complex pension products, which are not easily understood. It also adds to the
evidence provided by Madrian und Shea (2001) who demonstrated that the decision
for or against speciﬁc pension products depends to a large extent on how the diﬀerent
products were presented. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the extent of information about
the pension system is a key factor in the participation decision. This has been sug-
gested by Boeri et al. (2002). Many respondents in our sample lack the information
deemed necessary for taking the appropriate retirement saving decisions (Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2006). This lack of information is particularly high among respondents with
low education and income, conﬁrming US results by Lusardi (1999).
Therefore, it is not surprising that we ﬁnd striking diﬀerences in private pension
enrolment by socio-demographic characteristics. We ﬁnd that these enrolment
patterns do not always follow the incentive scheme. In many cases, they better ﬁt
the patterns predicted by the availability of information about the pension system.
In general, households with higher levels of educational attainment and households
in the middle- and upper-income brackets are more likely to make use of Riester
subsidies than low-income and low-education households.
Finally, we provide circumstantial evidence for displacement eﬀects. For example,
households who plan to purchase housing property are less likely to enrol in a Riester
pension plan. The same holds for households who attach high importance to a be-
quest motive. Occupational pensions and other forms of private pensions, however,
act as complements rather than as substitutes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by
presenting the key institutional features of subsidized pension schemes in Germany
and the uptake of Riester pensions between 2001 and 2006. Sections 3 and 4 provide
descriptive and econometric evidence on the dynamics of enrolment in Riester pen-
sion plans by socio-economic and psychological characteristics. Section 5 concludes.
2 The incentives for Riester pensions
While Riester pensions are voluntary, they have been designed to ﬁll the gap that will
be created by the scheduled reduction of public pension beneﬁts in response to the
pressures of population aging. In order to achieve this aim, the German Retirement
Savings Act2 introduced a comprehensive regime of saving incentives for certiﬁed
pension products (‘Riester pensions ’). These retirement saving plans are eligible
for subsidies in the form of ﬂat-rate beneﬁts or tax relief. Initially, certiﬁcation regu-
lations and subsidy mechanisms were rather complex, but they were signiﬁcantly
simpliﬁed in 2005. We ﬁrst describe the initial situation because it bears many lessons
for eﬀective subsidy design.
2.1 Initial criteria and incentives
Criteria for ‘certiﬁable ’ products. Initially, private pension plans were eligible for
subsidies if they fulﬁlled 11 criteria stipulated by the Certiﬁcation of Retirement
Pension Contracts Act. These criteria included, among others, the following
2 The law ‘Altersvermo¨gensgesetz’ stems from 2001.
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requirements : savers must make regular contributions; providers must guarantee
that the nominal rate of return in each calendar year be strictly positive; pension
beneﬁts must be disbursed as certain types of lifelong annuities ; lump sum payments
at retirement must not exceed 20% of the accumulated wealth ; administrative and
marketing costs must be spread over at least ten years ; and all providers must register
at a supervisory board.
Eligibility. Not all households are eligible for the subsidies. The eligibility criteria are
complex, although the intension was that everyone aﬀected by the reduction in public
pension beneﬁts should be eligible for private pension subsidies. Hence, the group of
eligible beneﬁciaries includes employees paying mandatory social insurance con-
tributions ; recipients of wage compensation beneﬁts (such as unemployment beneﬁt,
child-raising beneﬁts, etc.) ; self-employed people who are mandatory members of the
public pension system; farmers ; and tenured civil servants.3 Spouses of eligible in-
dividuals are also entitled to receive subsidies (‘ indirect entitlements ’) provided that
they enroll in a separate pension plan of their own.
Subsidies. Due to government budget constraints, the subsidy scheme was phased in
step-by-step, starting in 2002 and ending in 2008, doubling the applicable parameters
in each step. This is shown in Table 1. Column 1 shows the percentage of gross
earnings that must be contributed to the plan in order to qualify for the full subsidy.
The full subsidy is displayed in columns 2–4 and has three elements. First, there is a
ﬂat-rate beneﬁt (column 2) for low- and middle-income households. Individuals
eligible for this ﬂat-rate beneﬁt pay their savings into a certiﬁed pension plan and ﬁle
an application form for subsidies each year. The plan provider receives the ﬂat-rate
Table 1. State incentives for supplementary pension provision
Maximum
contribution
[percentage of gross
earnings]
Basic
beneﬁt
[e p.a.]
Child
beneﬁt
[e p.a.]
Maximum
tax deduction
[e p.a.]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2002 1 38 46 525
2004 2 76 92 1,050
2006 3 114 138 1,575
2008 4 154 185* 2,100
Note : * The child allowance is e300 for children born after 2007.
3 The precise deﬁnition of persons eligible for state subsidies is very complicated. Reform proposals include
widening entitlements to the entire active population or all tax payers. Simpler eligibility rules are ex-
pected to increase uptake more than proportionally. Such a reform would also reach individuals with very
low levels of social security – such as people in low-income ‘mini jobs’ or the part-time self-employed
(Commission for the Sustainable Financing of the German Social Security System, 2004).
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beneﬁt and credits it to the account as part of the total contribution. Second, all
eligible savers receive an additional beneﬁt for each child (column 3). Third, con-
tributions to Riester pension plans can be tax deductable as special expenses up to a
maximum amount (column 4). This amount has been ﬁxed in nominal terms at
e2,100 from 2008 onwards, which will, unless changed, eventually erode this third
subsidization mechanism.4
Subsidies are reduced proportionally if contributions to the Riester plan are lower
than the maximum indicated in column 1. Since the subsidy itself is counted as part of
that contribution, some mathematical skills are required to compute the exact own
contribution required for the full subsidy – another feature reducing the transparency
of the subsidy design. Moreover, the minimum own contribution depended on the
number of children and the year in which the Riester plan was signed.
The complexity of the design has distracted households from the substantial depth
of the subsidies. While low earners receive a relatively high subsidy due to the ﬂat-rate
subsidy, higher earners beneﬁt additionally from the tax deductions. Overall, the
subsidies average about 45% of contributions, varying between 24% and 90%
depending on income and number of children, and generated annual expenditures
of 740 million Euro in 2007.5
Use for the purchase of real estate. Another institutional feature is worth mentioning
because it aﬀects potential displacement eﬀects discussed in Section 4. While savings
usually must be accumulated until retirement and then disbursed in some type of
annuity, there is an exception for owner-occupied housing where between e10,000
and e50,000 may be withdrawn from the accumulated capital for the purpose of
purchasing owner-occupied property. The amount withdrawn must be paid back into
the pension plan in monthly instalments by the age of 65; otherwise the subsidies
must be paid back.
2.2 Uptake of ‘Riester pensions ’ and amended eligibility criteria
Quarterly uptake ﬁgures are provided by the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social
Aﬀairs and displayed in Figure 1.
Around 1.4 million Riester pension plans were taken up in the ﬁrst year after
the introduction of incentives.6 After a period of initial enthusiasm, however, demand
for Riester pensions ﬂattened in 2003 and 2004. This lackluster development and
widespread criticism of the complex eligibility and subsidy design led to simpliﬁcation
in 2005 in an attempt to improve acceptance by households and providers :
1 The application procedure was simpliﬁed by replacing it with a one-oﬀ perma-
nent beneﬁt application. Savers eligible for subsidies can now authorize their
pension provider to submit an allowance application on their behalf every year.
4 An automatic inﬂation adjustment was suggested for instance by the Commission for the Sustainable
Financing of the German Social Security Systems (2004), of which one author was a member, and
Sommer (2007).
5 See Bundesbank (2002).
6 For an analysis of the initial phase see Du¨nn and Fasshauer (2003).
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2 The number of certiﬁcation criteria was reduced from 11 to 5. Speciﬁcally, the
amount to be annualized was reduced from 80% to 70%.
3 The saver’s minimum own contribution is now standardized to e60 per annum.
4 The information duties of pension providers were extended. Information about
investment options, the structure of the portfolio, and the risk potential were
also given. Providers were required to introduce a standardized calculation
facilitating comparisons of alternative products.
5 Acquisition and marketing costs can now be spread over ﬁve rather than ten
years ; thereby selling Riester pensions became more attractive for providers.
Demand for Riester pensions rose signiﬁcantly in 2005 after these changes came into
eﬀect, see Figure 1. Around 900,000 new policies – around four times as many as
during the whole of 2004 – were signed in the last quarter of 2005 alone. This upward
trend continued throughout 2006. By the end of 2006, a total of more than 8 million
pension plans eligible for subsidy support had been taken up. About 37 million in-
dividuals are estimated to have been eligible for subsidies (Sommer, 2007) ; hence,
coverage is about 23%.
Besides the quarterly uptake ﬁgures, there is only limited information on socio-
economic characteristics provided by the Central Riester Subsidy Oﬃce. Stolz and
Rieckhoﬀ (2005, 2006) claim that individuals with low labor incomes, women, fam-
ilies, and employees in East Germany are well represented among subsidy recipients.
Stolz andRieckhoﬀ therefore suggest that social policy objectives have been achieved.7
Figure 1. Development of Riester pensions
Source : Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales (2006).
7 In the contribution year 2003, 56.1% of beneﬁciaries were female and 43.9% male. Of those receiving
allowances, 29% were from the new federal states in eastern Germany, 71% from the former territory of
West Germany. Around 2.4 million people received a basic allowance and 1.1 million people an ad-
ditional child’s allowance. These shares remained more or less unchanged in 2004.
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3 Uptake by socio-economic class using the SAVE data
The aggregate numbers analyzed by Stolz and Rieckhoﬀ do not precisely tell us which
population groups are covered by Riester pensions. They do not contain household
income, speciﬁcally income not due to social security taxes and income from in-
dividuals indirectly entitled to Riester subsidies. Hence, they do not provide a sound
statistical basis to study the distributional aspects of the subsidy scheme. Moreover,
the aggregate ﬁgures do not give information about possible displacement eﬀects ; for
example, they do not show competing products for old-age provision (which are not
subsidized) or any other savings.
This and the following section therefore use new micro data, the SAVE panel, to
shed light on these issues. We ﬁrst brieﬂy describe this data set, and then present
bivariate descriptive statistics shedding light on the socio-economic status of the
subsidy recipients. Section 4 deepens the analysis by employing a multivariate re-
gression approach.
3.1 The SAVE data
SAVE is a new longitudinal data set containing information on households’ saving
and asset choices, socio-demographic characteristics, and psychosocial determinants
of savings behavior, particularly related to old-age provision.8 The SAVE data oﬀer
the unique opportunity to investigate saving and old-age provision because the data
are released very timely and include a broad variety of explanatory variables. In each
year, the survey asked households about their ﬁnancial decisions in the previous year.
Thus far, the panel was surveyed in 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007.
The unit of SAVE is the respondent and the respondent’s spouse (referred to in the
following as household). In 2006, the total sample size was about 3,500 households.
We restrict the analysis in this paper to those households who have not yet retired.9
All descriptive statistics in this paper are weighted. The weights are based on the
income and age distribution of the German Microcensus.10
3.2 Dynamics of uptake
Figure 2 shows how the proportion of households making supplementary provision
for old age developed between 2000, the year before the Riester reform, and 2005.
Supplementary pension provision is broadly deﬁned including occupational pensions,
8 See Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2008) for a detailed description of the dataset. Essig (2005), Bo¨rsch-Supan and
Essig (2005) and Schunk (2006) provide further details. We are grateful to the German Science
Foundation (DFG) for funding this data set.
9 To be precise: the interview is conducted with the individual who knows best about the household’s
ﬁnances.
10 As in all surveys that deal with sensitive topics such as household ﬁnances, item non-response to sensitive
questions is not ignorable (see Essig and Winter (2003) and Schunk (2006) for discussion and docu-
mentation). To prevent biased inference based on an analysis of complete cases only, an iterative mul-
tiple imputation procedure has been applied to the SAVE data (Schunk, 2008). Multiple imputation
simulates the distribution of missing data and allows for a more realistic assessment of variances in
subsequent analyses than single imputation. The procedure uses a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo method
to replace missing data by draws from an estimate of the conditional distribution of the data (Hoynes
et al., 1998; Kennickell, 1998). All results in this paper use the fully imputed SAVE data.
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state-subsidized pension products, and all other forms of private old-age provision
such as private pension schemes, which are not eligible for direct state support or
which were started before the subsidy scheme was introduced.11
Figure 2 shows that the proportion of households with supplementary pension
provision grew enormously from 17% to 43% in the few years between 2000 and
2005. This development is remarkable in a country such as Germany, which features
a ﬁrst pillar of retirement income support that has traditionally been extremely
dominant. The aggregate replacement rate (average net pension income divided by
average net wage income) is currently about 70%. Even after the recent reforms, it is
scheduled to be above 55% in 2030 when population aging reaches its peak. This is
still substantially higher than the current replacement rate of 48% in the US.
Which diﬀerent forms of supplemental pension provision have contributed to this
development? We distinguish between occupational pensions, subsidized Riester
pensions, and other unsubsidized private pension instruments.12 Figure 3 shows how
these three vehicles of private old-age provision have developed in the period from
2002 to 2005.13
There has been a marked increase in all three instruments. The proportion of
households with occupational pensions almost doubled between 2002 and 2005, and
so did the share of households with unsubsidized private pensions. The share of
households with Riester pensions almost tripled.
Proportion of households with occupational pensions, 
Riester-pensions and other pension schemes
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Figure 2. Spread of private pension provision
Note : The thin line shows the 90% conﬁdence interval.
Weighted ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005,
2006, non-retired households.
11 For the precise wording of the question in the questionnaire refer to question 1 in the appendix.
12 See the appendix for the exact wording of the question in the SAVE survey instrument covering these
products.
13 The year 2000 has not been taken into account as pension provision had not been included in the SAVE
questionnaire before the introduction of the Riester pension.
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Unsubsidized private pensions are still more widespread than Riester pensions.
Between 2004 and 2005, i.e. just before the changes in the legislation making Riester
pensions more transparent, unsubsidized pensions even grew faster than the Riester
pensions, in spite of the high subsidy levels. In addition to the intransparent design of
Riester products, other possible explanations include the demand by households who
are ineligible for state subsidies, a shift in demand towards private pensions as a
response to the abolishment of tax beneﬁts for whole life insurance policies, and a
preference for more ﬂexible and potentially higher proﬁt-yielding products.
The large proportion of households with supplemental pension plans may disguise
the fact that some households have several plans while others have none at all.
Figure 4 therefore shows how many households subscribe to more than one sup-
plemental pension scheme.
Indeed, combining several instruments is common. While Figure 4 shows that the
share of households without any supplemental pension instrument has declined, it is
still more than half of the population. In 2002, three quarters of households had
neither their own occupational pension nor a Riester or any other private pension. In
2005, this was still true for about 57% of households. If whole life insurance policies
are also taken into account (not depicted in Figure 4), this percentage declines to
38%. Compared to Anglo-Saxon countries, the saturation point has clearly not yet
been reached in Germany.
The proportion of households with several pension instruments also increased in
the observed period. This suggests that the increasing prevalence of supplemental
pensions is not simply due to households, which had not previously made private
provision for old age, but is also increasingly due to the number of households which
use several such instruments.
Proportion of households with different kinds of pension 
schemes
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Figure 3. Spread of diﬀerent private pension instruments
Note : The thin line shows the 90% conﬁdence interval. Weighted
ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006,
non-retired households.
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3.3 Uptake by household characteristics
We now examine which households – stratiﬁed by age, number of children, edu-
cation, and income – were actually reached by the various supplemental pension
schemes.14
Supplementary pension uptake by age
When examining the prevalence of demand for private pensions by age, one would
expect to ﬁnd diﬀerences because the replacement rate of the public pension system
will slowly decline in response to population aging. Younger generations are thus
more strongly aﬀected than older generations. One would therefore anticipate higher
participation rates among younger households relative to among older ones.
The distribution of Riester pensions across age groups in Figure 5 more or less
reﬂects this anticipated proﬁle. Despite the high rate of return, which heads of
household aged 50 to 59 can expect to receive with a Riester pension, fewer older
households have taken out a Riester pension than younger ones. Riester pensions are
most common in the group aged 30 to 49, which also includes the baby boom gen-
eration that will be most aﬀected by the lower replacement rate of future public
pension beneﬁts. Participation is also signiﬁcantly lower among younger households;
partly because many members of these households are not yet gainfully employed,
e.g. in training or education. In addition, this age group has fewer children and thus
receives a lower subsidy. The data reﬂect this in a higher proportion of younger rather
than older households, which hold unsubsidized private pension instruments.
Proportion of households with different kinds of suppl. old-
age provision
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Figure 4. Households with several pension instruments
Note : The thin line shows the 90% conﬁdence interval. Weighted
ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006,
non-retired households.
14 For a similar study of supplementary pension provision in the United Kingdom, see Disney et al. (2001).
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Supplementary pension uptake by number of children
Figure 6 shows the strong positive relationship between the number of children and
the proportion of households with a Riester pension plan. As pointed out in Table 1,
Riester subsidies increase linearly with the number of children. Hence, it is not sur-
prising that there is strong demand for Riester products among parents with more
than two children.
One in ﬁve households with two or more children – almost twice as many as among
childless households – had a Riester pension plan in 2005. Another striking ﬁnding is
that Riester pensions are particularly popular with larger families with children. This
is conﬁrmed by the development over time shown in Table 2 for the period 2002 to
2005 when Riester pension plans were proliferating most markedly among house-
holds with more than three children.
Supplemental pension uptake by education
As pointed out in the introduction, demand for private pension provision is closely
related to knowledge about ﬁnancial issues in general, and information about the
social security system in particular. More speciﬁcally, the awareness of supplemen-
tary pension provision and the willingness to postpone consumption today for more
consumption tomorrow is contingent on knowledge about the conditions attached to
state subsidies and the various take-up options available.
Figure 7 shows the proportion of households investing in old-age provision by
vocational qualiﬁcation, which we use as an indicator for ﬁnancial knowledge.
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Figure 5. Supplementary pension provision by age group in 2005
Note : The thin line shows the 90% conﬁdence interval. Weighted ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
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Indeed, the presence of vocational training and the uptake of supplementary pen-
sion provision are positively related. The prevalence of occupational pensions among
university graduates is particularly high. Riester pensions are now equally common
among heads of household with intermediate and higher educational qualiﬁcations.15
Table 2. Development by number of children
Pension provision by number of children
2005 (change from 2002)
Number of
children
Occupational
pension
Riester
pension
Other pension
schemes
none 17% (+7) 12% (+8) 24% (+13)
1 child 27% (+13) 15% (+9) 23% (+11)
2 children 25% (+9) 19% (+12) 18% (+7)
3 children 20% (+3) 21% (+12) 22% (+10)
more than 3 17% (+5) 23% (+17) 15% (+10)
Proportion of households with private pension schemes
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Figure 6. Demand for private pensions by number of children in 2005
Note : The thin line shows the 90% conﬁdence interval. Weighted ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
15 Looking at educational levels shows that people leaving school with a lower secondary school qualiﬁ-
cation make somewhat less provision for old age in any of the forms considered here than do heads of
household with a secondary school leaving certiﬁcate or general university entrance qualiﬁcation. While
there are no diﬀerences between people holding a secondary school leaving certiﬁcate and those with
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While there has been an increase in the number of supplemental pension plans held by
households without any vocational training across all three schemes, the increase in
the number of occupational and Riester pensions since 2002 trails behind that of the
other two education groups, see Table 3.
Supplemental pension uptake by income
Finally, we consider the relationship between income and the demand for sup-
plementary pension provision. Figure 8 shows that the proportion of households
holding private pension instruments increases with growing disposable household
income. This pattern is most apparent for occupational pensions. Around 7% of
households in the lowest income bracket have taken up Riester pension plans, while
about a third is in the upper income bracket. It is remarkable that Riester pensions
are much more equally distributed by income than occupational pensions or un-
subsidized private pension schemes.
All income groups have exhibited an increasing demand for supplemental pensions
since 2002, see Table 4. Starting from an already lower initial level, the increase in
percentage points is least apparent in the lowest income bracket. This eﬀect is less
pronounced when expressed in relative percentage terms. Particularly striking is the
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Figure 7. Demand for private pensions by vocational training in 2005
Note : The thin line shows the 90% conﬁdence interval. Weighted ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
higher qualiﬁcations as far as Riester pensions are concerned, occupational pensions are much more
common among more highly educated heads of household. Overall, the diﬀerences are larger if we
diﬀerentiate by vocational qualiﬁcations.
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impressive growth of occupational pensions and unsubsidized private pension in-
struments among high-income households.
Table 5 focuses on Riester pensions. It shows the development between 2004 and
2005 and provides some idea about the dynamic development in the four income
brackets.
An important result from Table 5 is the markedly lower increase of the share of
households with Riester pension plans in the lower-income range since 2004. This
Table 3. Development by vocational training between 2002 and 2005
Demand for private pensions by vocational training
2005 (change from 2002)
Vocational
training
Occupational
pension
Riester-
pension
Other pension
schemes
None 8% (+4) 6% (+3) 9% (+8)
Professional training 23% (+8) 18% (+11) 20% (+9)
University degree 27% (+10) 18% (+10) 31% (+13)
Note : Weighted ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
Proportion of households with private pension schemes
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Figure 8. Demand for private pensions by monthly household disposable income in 2005
Note : Weighted ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
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ﬁnding is at odds with the data from the Central Riester Subsidy Oﬃce described in
Section 2, which show that mostly low-income earners receive Riester subsidies.
The discrepancy can be explained by the already mentioned diﬀerence between
income concepts in the two data sets. While the data from the Subsidy Oﬃce is based
on individual labor income earned in the previous year (the base relevant for subsidy
computation), the SAVE data records total disposable household income and thus
also includes labor income earned by a spouse and other forms of income such as
income from assets and transfers. Since the welfare position of a household is better
described by its overall disposable income rather than labor income of a single part-
ner, we are convinced that our broader income measure is a more appropriate cri-
terion in assessing whether a target group has been reached by the Riester subsidies.16
The diﬀerence between our results and those by the administrative data suggests
that many subsidy recipients with low labor income have other income sources they
use to accumulate pension savings.17 A recent analysis based on income tax returns
conﬁrms this view. It shows that Riester pensions are most prominent among de-
clared household incomes between 30.000e and 100.000e ; they are less prevalent
among low and very high earners (Kriete-Dodds and Vorgrimler, 2007).
4 Multivariate analyses and displacement eﬀects
Section 3 has evaluated bivariate relationships. In this section, we now evaluate the
impact of household characteristics on the uptake of supplemental pensions using a
multivariate regression approach. We also take account of many additional variables,
Table 4. Development by income brackets between 2002 and 2005
Demand for private pensions by monthly disposable household income
2005 (change from 2002)
Income
bracket
Occupational
pension
Riester-
pension
Other pension
schemes
0–999 EUR 3% (+2) 7% (+4) 10% (+5)
1,000–1,999 EUR 15% (+5) 17% (+10) 18% (+10)
2,000–3,999 EUR 32% (+13) 20% (+12) 25% (+10)
>4,000 EUR 45% (+23) 21% (+14) 40% (+25)
Note : Weighted ﬁgures.
Source : Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
16 The Subsidy Oﬃce, for example, classiﬁes a wife working in a low-paid part-time job as being on a low
income, even if the husband was on a high salary. In our analysis using the SAVE data, we assign such
couples to the upper-income bracket.
17 Second, a more technical issue is the unit of reference based on which the calculated proportions are
calculated. While we relate the rates of participation in the Riester pension scheme to all households in
the population as a whole, Stolz and Rieckhoﬀ (2005, 2006) calculate their proportional ﬁgures from
within the group of allowance beneﬁciaries. This latter approach neglects the distribution of the observed
characteristics in the total population.
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speciﬁcally competing motives for saving and indicators, which reﬂect knowledge
about the pension system and general ﬁnancial matters.
As already pointed out, Riester pensions are not the only vehicle for voluntary
contract-based retirement saving. We therefore employ a bivariate probit regression
model, in which the decision to take up a subsidized Riester pension plan and the
decision to enroll in other unsubsidized private pension plans are modeled simul-
taneously. In other words, we model unobserved factors inﬂuencing both the demand
for Riester products and other private pension plans which might be correlated.
Table 6 presents the results of two bivariate probit regression speciﬁcations.
Speciﬁcation A describes disposable income as a set of four quintile indicators.
Speciﬁcation B employs a quadratic function of disposable income. In both speciﬁ-
cations, the ﬁrst dependent variable, shown in columns 1 and 3, indicates whether a
household has a Riester pension plan, while the second dependent variable, shown in
columns 2 and 4, indicates whether a household has an unsubsidized private pension
plan. All variables refer to the end of year 2005.
The regressions have a very satisfactory ﬁt, here measured as McFadden’s
R-squared (see the lower part of Table 6). Moreover, the estimated model indeed
exhibits a positive correlation between the two equations, or, more precisely, between
the unobservables in the decision to take up a subsidized Riester pension plan and the
decision to enroll in unsubsidized private pension plans. The bivariate probit model
therefore provides some eﬃciency gains relative to two separate probit regressions.
The correlation, however, is small and not statistically signiﬁcant.
In the following discussion, we will ﬁrst focus on Riester pension plans (columns 1
and 3) and then move on to other private pension products (columns 2 and 4).
4.1 Who has taken up Riester pensions?
The upper part of Table 6 contains coeﬃcients of the most important socio-
demographic characteristics. Personal characteristics such as age, gender, and
education refer to the ﬁnancial respondent of the household.
Age is speciﬁed as a quadratic function. The estimated age proﬁle is similar to the
one reported in Figure 5: the probability of taking up a Riester pension increases
initially, reaches its maximum at the age of about 40 and then falls steadily towards
retirement age. Using higher order polynomials does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the shape
of the age proﬁle.18
Table 5. Riester pension plans by income brackets in 2004 and 2005
Monthly disposable
household income [e] 0–999 1000–1999 2000–3999 Over 4000
2004
Participation rate 4.4% 10.5% 16.0% 17.1%
2005
Participation rate 7.3% 17.0% 20.0% 20.9%
18 Not shown. Available from the authors upon request.
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Table 6. Determinants of the demand for Riester and other private pension
products (bivariate probit estimates)
Speciﬁcation A Speciﬁcation B
Variable Riester
Other private
pensions Riester
Other private
pensions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Age 0.139 0.028 0.141 0.031
(5.08)*** (1.25) (5.19)*** (1.38)
(Age)2 x0.002 x0.000 x0.002 x0.001
(6.12)*** (1.84)* (6.24)*** (1.98)**
Female (dummy) x0.111 0.023 x0.100 x0.028
(1.54) (0.35) (1.39) (0.41)
Married (dummy) 0.049 x0.192 0.046 x0.178
(0.61) (2.49)** (0.57) (2.32)**
Number of children 0.153 x0.014 0.155 x0.012
(5.54)*** (0.49) (5.62)*** (0.42)
Education
High school diploma (Abitur)
(dummy)
0.082 0.150 0.074 0.147
(0.84) (1.69)* (0.76) (1.66)*
No vocational training (dummy) x0.341 x0.418 x0.361 x0.436
(2.43)** (3.22)*** (2.59)*** (3.39)***
University degree (dummy) x0.022 0.218 x0.080 0.194
(0.17) (1.88)* (0.14) (1.67)*
Occupation
White collar worker (dummy) x0.074 0.154 x0.066 0.166
(0.81) (1.74)* (0.72) (1.88)*
Tenured civil servant (dummy) 0.028 0.231 x0.021 0.228
(0.20) (1.80)* (0.15) (1.78)**
Self-employed (dummy) x0.117 0.456 x0.107 0.460
(0.88) (4.12)*** (0.81) (4.16)***
Unemployed (dummy) 0.079 x0.147 0.040 x0.184
(0.67) (1.24) (0.35) (1.58)*
Income
Disposable income: 1. Quintile x0.202 x0.352 – –
(1.45) (2.69)***
Disposable income: 2. Quintile 0.027 x0.204 – –
(0.25) (–1.91)*
Disposable income: 3. Quintile Reference category
Disposable income: 4. Quintile x0.138 x0.064 – –
(1.41) (0.68)
Disposable income: 5. Quintile x0.167 0.004 – –
(1.55) (0.04)
Disposable income: – – 0.001 0.101
(0.02) (1.81)*
(Disposable income)^2 – – x0.006 x0.005
(0.74) (0.99)
Wealth
Net assets 0.018 0.084 0.019 0.077
(0.76) (3.31)*** (0.85) (3.02)***
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Table 6. (cont.)
Speciﬁcation A Speciﬁcation B
Variable Riester
Other private
pensions Riester
Other private
pensions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Net assets)2 x0.000 x0.000 x0.000 x0.000
(0.46) (–2.52)** (0.46) (2.39)**
Property owner (dummy) 0.081 x0.093 0.067 x0.084
(0.93) (1.06) (0.77) (0.97)
Financial knowledge
Contact with tax advisor (dummy) 0.019 0.158 0.029 0.157
(0.25) (2.27)** (0.39) (2.25)**
No awareness of anticipated
replacement rate
x0.119 x0.099 x0.119 x0.106
(1.64)* (1.43) (1.64)* (1.53)
Saving motives
Intention to buy real estate 0.001 0.143 x0.001 0.147
(0.01) (1.67)* (0.01) (1.71)*
Reason for saving: Buy real estate x0.090 x0.057 x0.089 x0.058
(2.11)* (1.39) (2.08)** (1.43)
Reason for saving: Provide for
unforeseen events
x0.096 x0.057 x0.086 x0.052
(1.44) (0.86) (1.28) (0.79)
Reason for saving: Pay oﬀ debts x0.055 x0.041 x0.054 x0.043
(1.24) (0.99) (1.22) (1.03)
Reason for saving: Old-age provision 0.229 0.694 0.218 0.691
(3.06)*** (7.87)*** (2.92)*** (7.86)***
Reason for saving: Holiday 0.009 x0.068 0.012 x0.069
(0.18) (1.49) (0.25) (1.51)
Reason for saving: Finance major
purchases
0.042 0.039 0.035 0.037
(0.81) (0.77) (0.68) (0.72)
Reason for saving: Finance grand-
child education
x0.038 x0.091 x0.038 x0.094
(0.81) (2.02)** (0.80) (2.09)**
Reason for saving: Inheritance x0.124 0.090 x0.128 0.090
(2.32)** (1.80)* (2.39)** (1.80)*
Reason for saving: State subsidies 0.264 x0.015 0.269 0.008
(6.03)*** (0.38) (6.13)*** (0.20)
Alternative instruments
Other form of suppl. pension
provision (dummy)
0.469 0.462 0.466 0.466
(6.27)*** (6.56)*** (6.25)*** (6.64)***
Constant x3.936 x2.714 x4.023 x3.069
(6.30)*** (4.98)*** (6.69)*** (5.84)***
Mc-Fadden R2 0.137 0.136
Rho [Chi2(1)] 0.055 [1.32] 0.060 [1.54]
Number of observations 2255 2255
Notes : Absolute value of the z statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence interval, ** Signiﬁcant at 5%, *** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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The number of children is highly signiﬁcant. The strong relationship between
taking up a Riester pension and the number of children already depicted in Figure 6
is robust and persists even if the inﬂuence of additional household characteristics is
taken into account.
The ﬁnancial respondent’s gender, marital status, and occupational status have
statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. Financial respondents with a high school dip-
loma that qualiﬁes for university admission are statistically no more likely to have
enrolled in a Riester pension. This insigniﬁcant result is interesting because it appears
to contradict the bivariate pattern depicted in Figure 7 and the coeﬃcient on
vocational training, which is highly signiﬁcant. One interpretation is that the more
theoretical general schooling is less suited as an indicator for ﬁnancial knowledge
than the more practical vocational training.
The next group of variables in the regression concerns the ﬁnancial situation of
the surveyed households. We test the robustness of the income eﬀect by using two
speciﬁcations for disposable household income. In speciﬁcation A, we include
household income using a set of dummy variables indicating income quintiles
(reference category is the third income quintile). Only households in the bottom
income quintile have a weakly signiﬁcant lower probability in 2005 of having a
Riester pension than households in the medium-income range; all other quintile
indicators are insigniﬁcant. Thus, households with very low incomes have lower
uptake rates of Riester pensions, while there is no measurable diﬀerence among
the higher-income quintiles. To investigate the sensitivity of this result, the second
regression variant involves a quadratic speciﬁcation. This speciﬁcation B does
not show signiﬁcant t-statistics, although the polynomial coeﬃcients are jointly
signiﬁcant (p-value 0.0625). Using higher order polynomials yields similar results.19
Being unemployed has no additional eﬀect on taking up Riester pensions, neither
does the value of other ﬁnancial assets, speciﬁed again as a quadratic polynomial.
Two variables are designed to capture how well a household is informed about
ﬁnancial matters and the pension system. First, we include a dummy variable, which
indicates contact with a tax advisor. This variable is insigniﬁcant. A second variable
indicates the ability of the ﬁnancial respondent to estimate the correct replacement
rate of public old-age pensions (i.e., the expected retirement income relative to the
expected pre-retirement income). This variable is signiﬁcantly negative at a 10%
conﬁdence level :20 respondents who lack knowledge about their future income in
old age are less likely to enrol in the Riester pension scheme. The causality of this
relationship is unclear, however, as households which opt for a Riester pension
are usually informed by their ﬁnancial advisors about their statutory pension en-
titlements during the sales process. Hence, households tend to learn the correct
replacement rate during the decision-making process.
Saving decisions are complex and may involve psychological aspects not captured
by the conventional set of socio-economic variables. We have therefore included
a set of variables in the regression which reﬂect the importance of diﬀerent
19 See footnote above.
20 For the precise wording of this question, refer to the appendix.
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saving motives for respondents. We are speciﬁcally interested in three saving motives:
the acquisition of real estate, the wish to bequeath wealth, and pocketing state
subsidies.
First, there is evidence pointing to a possible displacement eﬀect between old-age
provision and real estate purchase. This is apparent when looking at households who
report a particular interest in saving for the purchase of real estate property. The
more important this savings motive is, the less likely respondents have taken up a
Riester pension plan.
A second signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient is attached to the variable indicating a
wish to save for a bequest. Our interpretation is that the requirement for Riester plans
to be paid out as an annuity acts as a disincentive for households for whom making a
bequest is an important saving motive.
Third, the high level of subsidization was designed as an enticement to attract
savers towards Riester pensions. Do respondents conﬁrm this? Indeed, our ﬁndings
show a strongly signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient, demonstrating that households for
which state subsidies represent an important savings motive are most likely to take up
a Riester pension plan.
We conclude that, as far as old-age pension provision and the three mentioned
saving motives are concerned, expressed attitudes to savings correspond with actual
saving behavior.
As mentioned earlier, Riester pension plans and unsubsidized private pension
plans are not the only vehicles for supplementalold-age provision. In addition, there
are occupational pension plans. Moreover, whole life insurance products have been
very popular as instruments to provide a lump-sum payment immediately after re-
tirement.21 The coeﬃcient of a variable indicating the presence of such instruments is
statistically signiﬁcant and positive: households which are already covered by one
of these alternative pension types are also more likely to have a Riester pension
plan. One interpretation is that households who think ahead and invest in old-age
provision at all tend to use several instruments for this purpose. As opposed to saving
for real estate acquisition or saving for bequests, where we found substitution, this
result gives evidence for a form of ‘crowding in’ among pension products.
Finally, it is informative to compare the results of Table 6, which refer to the year
2005, with the same regression applied to the data a year earlier.22 This comparison is
interesting because the application procedure for Riester pensions was simpliﬁed and
many eligibility criteria were removed in 2005 (see Section 2). As a result, a large
number of new Riester policies were taken up in 2005. In turn, with a broader range
of households enrolled in 2005 than in 2004, households enrolled in 2004 are likely to
have been better informed and have in general been less challenged by the complexity
of savings decisions.
We conﬁne our analysis to two key examples: education and income. First, both
variables used as indicators for ﬁnancial education (high school exam qualifying
for university admission and the extent to which someone is informed about the
21 See German Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Aﬀairs (2006).
22 The regression results for 2004 can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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replacement level of the public pension system) are highly signiﬁcant in the 2004
regression, while they were insigniﬁcant and only weakly signiﬁcant, respectively, in
the regression using the 2005 data. Second, the signiﬁcance of the income brackets
changed. In 2004, the two lowest income quintiles had signiﬁcantly lower enrolment
into Riester pension plans, while a year later, this was only true for the lowest 20%.
This demonstrates that the acceptance of the Riester products has reached the lowest
income bracket in 2005, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerences left in all higher income
brackets.
Summarizing our regression results regarding Riester pensions, the most important
factor determining whether or not Riester pension plans are taken up appears to
be the number of children. This is, as described in Section 2, also a key factor de-
termining the size of the subsidy. As far as income is concerned, only the lowest 20%
of the income distribution have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of being enrolled in
a Riester pension plan. The desire to purchase property and the wish to bequeath
assets are savings motives which compete with taking up Riester pensions, while
occupational pensions and whole life insurance are found to be complements rather
than substitutes.
4.2 Who has enrolled in unsubsidized private pension plans?
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the diﬀusion of Riester pensions, it
is essential to take unsubsidized private pension plans into account. It may well be
a rational decision to avoid the highly regulated Riester pension and to choose a
pension product that corresponds more closely with one’s own preferences and/or
that may promise a higher rate of return, despite foregoing the state subsidy. Bearing
this in mind, columns 2 and 4 in Table 6 describe the probability of having a private
pension plan that does not qualify for state subsidies.
The age eﬀect is similar to the results for the Riester pension. However, in stark
contrast to the results in the Riester pension equation, respondents with a high school
degree qualifying for university admission are more likely to have made alternative
provisions for old age. This eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant. Lack of knowledge about
future pension replacements rates also correlates negatively with enrolment into
private pension plans, again pointing to the importance of information about the
pension system and general ﬁnancial education.
As one might expect, the self-employed who, for the most part, are not eligible for
direct subsidies, have a higher demand for other private pension plans. Unmarried
households are less likely to enroll in a private pension.
The inﬂuence of children is another important diﬀerence to the results in the
Riester pension equation. The number of children has no inﬂuence at all on the
enrolment in unsubsidized pension plans. This shows that the child-related subsidies
indeed attracted demand for Riester pension plans.
Income and asset eﬀects are also strikingly diﬀerent between subsidized and un-
subsidized pension plans. The two lowest income quintiles show a signiﬁcantly lower
probability of enrolling into unsubsidized pension plans than for the middle-income
quintile (speciﬁcation A), and the linear term of the polynomial is now highly
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signiﬁcant (speciﬁcation B). In contrast to the Riester pension equation, other
ﬁnancial wealth has considerable explanatory power for the probability to enroll in
unsubsidized pension plans.
The indicator variables for various savings motives are largely insigniﬁcant. In
contrast to the Riester pension equations, this also applies to the acquisition of real
estate property and the wish to bequeath assets. For the interpretation of the latter
ﬁnding, it is noteworthy that most unsubsidized private pension plans have an option
to be paid lump-sum at retirement, in contrast to the mandatory annuitization of
Riester products. We also included a variable measuring how strong the household
feels motivated to save for old-age provision. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
shows that, as far as old-age pension provision is concerned, expressed attitudes
correspond with actual behavior.
‘Financial support from the state ’ is insigniﬁcant as a savings motive. This is
no surprise given that these forms of retirement saving do not qualify for subsidies.
In contrast, this motive was highly signiﬁcant in the Riester pension equation.
Households clearly distinguish between forms of saving which qualify for state sub-
sidy and those which do not; households for which such state support is important
make conscious decisions in favor of the related products.
5 Conclusions
The recent pension reform in Germany provides helpful evidence to better under-
stand whether and how voluntary state-subsidized private pension plans are able to
ﬁll the gap that will be created by the reduction of pay-as-you-go public pension
beneﬁts.
A ﬁrst lesson is that new forms of subsidized saving need time before they really
take oﬀ. It took over ten years in the U.S., for example, before Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs) were accepted by households in the top two income tertiles. In
Germany, the Riester pension plans have exhibited a much more dynamic growth.
Growth in the ﬁrst few years was very steep, then stalled, but then rebound after the
2005 legislative changes. Overall, growth rates are much higher than those experi-
enced in the US.
There are several explanations for the discontinuous development of Riester pen-
sions. Poor product design is likely the cause for the initially poor performance
of Riester pensions. Moreover, the learning process regarding the need and way to
invest in old-age provision took time, despite heavy advertising. As people learn from
their social environment, the pace of this development depends on how widespread
such pensions are in the population at large (‘critical mass ’, Ruprecht, 2004), gen-
erating exponential growth until saturation is reached.
We cannot exactly identify whether the dynamic spread of Riester pensions is
due to the ﬁnancial incentives, the availability of information, or the marketing
eﬀorts made by government and providers, mainly insurance companies. However,
it is striking that the acceleration in Riester saving only kicked in after substantial
simpliﬁcations had been made to the scheme, i.e. after the changes in regulations
described in section 2, such as the introduction of a simpler one-oﬀ subsidy
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application and the reduction of eligibility criteria. Therefore, an important second
lesson is to avoid complex savings plans which are not immediately understood by
customers. It now takes time to make up for the damage which has been caused
by excessive complexity.
The target groups of the Riester reform in 2001 were mainly families with children
and individuals with low income. Among those, parents with more than one child
were best reached. Given the increased child beneﬁt of e300 per child which will be
available for children born after 2007, it seems that Riester pension plans will almost
certainly become more widespread among new parents. It remains to be seen whether
this subsidy increase will result in households switching from existing unsubsidized
savings vehicles to the subsidized Riester pension plans, and whether it will stimulate
additional saving.
The evidence is less compelling for the other target group, low-income households.
While administrative data of subsidy beneﬁciaries based on previous year’s earned
income show that people with below average earnings make up almost 70% of ben-
eﬁciaries, our SAVE data on disposable household income tells another story. The
share of households with Riester pensions is much lower in the lowest quintile
of household income distribution than in the middle- and upper-income brackets.
A third lesson is therefore that even deep subsidies do not appear to provide a suﬃ-
ciently strong incentive to households with very low incomes to postpone current
consumption in favor of retirement consumption.
Households with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to enroll
in Riester pensions than households with ﬁnancial respondents who have not com-
pleted any vocational training. Similarly, knowing future pension replacement levels
correlates positively with enrolling in private pension schemes. A fourth lesson,
therefore, is that information and the knowledge about arrangements relating to old-
age pension provision are clearly vital to achieving high uptake rates.
Finally, we have gained new insights about possible displacement eﬀects. While
the SAVE data do not allow for a cleanly designed experiment, they provide cir-
cumstantial evidence. First, households who desire to purchase real estate property
are signiﬁcantly less likely to have a Riester pension plan. The clumsy withdrawal
rule oﬀered by the Riester regulations clearly do not provide these households with
suﬃcient liquidity in order to persuade them to make provision for old age alongside
with saving to acquire real estate property. We ﬁnd similar evidence that stated
bequest motives displace Riester pension plans with their strict annuity rules. We do
not conclude that these restrictions should be alleviated. On the contrary, they are
needed since Riester pensions are designed to ﬁll the gap in public pension beneﬁts
after pension reform, and these pay-as-you-go pensions are paid out as a life-long
annuity.
While the desire to purchase property and the wish to bequeath assets are saving
motives which compete with taking up Riester pensions, occupational pensions and
whole life insurance are found to be complements rather than substitutes. This is an
important ﬁfth lesson. One interpretation is that households that think ahead and
invest in old-age provision tend to use several instruments for this purpose. In this
sense, there are ‘crowding in’ eﬀects of fostering retirement saving.
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6 Appendix: Relevant questionnaire items
1. Did your or your partner hold one of the following types of pension savings con-
tracts in December 200X?
– Occupational pension scheme, e.g. occupational pensions from type A
(Pensionsfonds) or type B (Pensionskasse) staﬀ pension fund and provident
funds as well as occupational direct pension promises or direct insurance
schemes
– State-subsidized private pension scheme (‘Riester pension’), i.e. state-pro-
moted and certiﬁed savings accounts which cannot be liquidated prior to re-
tirement
– Other contractually agreed private pension scheme, e.g. investment funds
geared speciﬁcally to the provision of pension cover, private pension insurance
policies which are not promoted by the state or which were taken out before
such support was available.
– No none of these, or already paid out.
2. What percentage of your anticipated last wage/salary will you receive as your
pension from the state pension insurance or civil service scheme?
– Estimated percentage:
– Do not know; not possible to estimate
– Does not apply – I have already retired or I am self-employed
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